We provide evidence that individuals selected from societies with high human capital are more likely to cooperate when placed in an environment comparable to the state of nature: The world of New York City diplomatic parking. National average IQ, a robust predictor of economic growth, is found to be a robust (negative) predictor of the number of unpaid parking tickets issued to a country's diplomatic delegation at the United Nations. Average years of education has a similarly strong relationship with civil behavior. Results hold after controlling for GDP per capita and corruption in the diplomat's home-country. We integrate this result into the experimental game theory literature on cognitive skills and pro-social behavior.
A separate literature shows that national average IQ, estimated by psychologist Richard Lynn and coauthors Vanhanen (2002, 2006) ; Lynn and Meisenberg (2010) ) from decades of intelligence tests run by private psychological testing firms, from international agencies, and from individual scholars, is a robust predictor of national economic performance (Weede and Kampf (2002) , Ram (2007) , Jones and Schneider (2006) ). Rindermann (2007a,b) has demonstrated that the Lynn et al. IQ estimates, which are available for many more countries than other cross-country cognitive measures such as international math and science tests, are strongly correlated with these international tests. The Lynn IQ data have been used in the medical literature (Eppig, et al.(2010) ) to argue that cross-country differences in infectious disease prevalence may explain these persistent differences in national average IQ. We use Lynn's data along with a more conventional average education measure to predict the size of the social capital stock in a unique setting: The world of diplomatic parking in New York City.
Because of diplomatic immunity, UN diplomats were long cavalier about paying New York City parking tickets; this insouciance largely ended in late 2002, when, as documented in Fisman and Miguel (2007) , the city government began removing diplomatic license plates from vehicles with too many unpaid tickets. In the pre-2003 period, diplomatic delegations differed widely in their scofflaw tendencies: The median diplomat averaged 8 unpaid tickets per year, the standard deviation was 33 tickets per year, and the maximum was 250 per year (from the Kuwaiti delegation).
But what drives these vast differences in behavior across delegations? Fisman and Miguel (2007) showed that diplomats appeared to bring their social norms with them when they came to New York to work at the United Nations: The corruption level in a diplomat's home country was a modestly reliable predictor of unpaid parking tickets. 2 We demonstrate two facts in this paper: First, that national average IQ and education levels predict home country corruption, 1 For a brief survey of modern intelligence research which discusses IQ correlates such as brain volume and brain wave response, we recommend Deary (2001) , written by a leader in the field; for a longer, more comprehensive survey, Jensen (1998) is invaluable. 2 In every specification where the authors controlled for the Pew survey measures of home-country anti-American attitudes, the anti-American sentiment measure was a statistically significant positive predictor of unpaid tickets, and consistent with the view that human capital creates social capital, and second, that national average IQ and education predict unpaid diplomatic parking tickets even when we control for the diplomat's home-country corruption and GDP per capita.
Why should one expect a nation's stock of human capital to predict the behavior of a small group of diplomats in New York City? One reason would be drawn from conventional political economy theories: Politicians and bureaucrats are drawn from the population distribution in their home country. Therefore, unless low-human-capital countries select their diplomats much more strongly for human capital than high-human-capital countries, national averages of human capital stocks should be positively correlated with the human capital of an average diplomatic delegation. This conjecture could be tested in future research.
In addition, there is some evidence in the economics literature (Fernández and Fogli (2009), Giulano (2007) ; but see Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994) ) Chicago Fed immigrant savings study, inter alia.) that cultural practices are developed early in life and persist quite strongly into adulthood: So people who have been playing tacit cooperation games in their daily lives in their home country for decades are likely to bring those norms with them to the UN Assembly. If reciprocation is rare in Berg-style trust games in their home country, these diplomats may well import those norms when they move to Manhattan. After all, taking advantage of a generous player (or city) is individually rational.
In the results below, we find that national average IQ and education are both predictors of one index of social capital, Fisman and Miguel's corruption measure; further, they provide independent ability to predict social capital, above and beyond their corruption index. If one wants to know whether a nation's government officials will obey the rule of law when few are watching, one would be well-advised to learn that nation's national average IQ and average years of education.
home-country corruption was statistically insignificant. These results, circulated in the working paper, were omitted in the published version because the Pew measures constrained the sample size to 42 countries.
Data
IQ data are from Lynn and Meisenberg's (2010) Rindermann (2007a,b) showed that the positive relationships across these various cognitive tests are quite robust. With a smaller, non-interpolated sample, our results hold quantitatively and qualitatively but fall modestly in statistical significance; such results are available upon request.
In the psychological literature, Wicherts et al. (2009 Wicherts et al. ( , 2010a in a series of papers in the psychological literature have argued that Lynn's estimates of national average IQ in sub-Saharan Africa are too low, although these critics note that " [t] here can be little doubt that Africans average lower IQs than do westerners" (Wicherts et al., 2010a, 17) . To address the possible concern of African IQ estimates that are "too low" we rerun our key estimates, Winsorizing the lowest IQ scores in our sample to a minimum of 75 and again at 80; our results are not affected.
This robustness to Winsorizing of National Average IQ was also found in Jones and Schneider (2010) .
As one researcher recently noted, "Where official national data are available for developing countries, fundamental problems of measurement produce a considerable amount of unquantified uncertainty." This is a statement not about developing-country IQ estimates, but about developing-country GDP and income measures (Young, 2010, Africa's growth miracle, p.1).
Alwyn Young notes: "Thus, for example, while the popular Penn World Tables purchasing power parity data set version 6.1 provides real income estimates for 45 sub-Saharan African countries, in 24 of those countries there has actually never been any benchmark study of prices."
(Young, p. 1). There is additional evidence for systematic weaknesses in developing country GDP data: Nye and Moul (2007) found that GDP data from less-developed countries systematically failed Benford's law, the tendency of a number's first digit to follow a particular statistical distribution (see also Judge and Schechter (2009) Descriptive statistics are in Table 1 ; a correlation matrix is in Table 2 . Correlation sample sizes vary widely, from a high of 152 (between corruption and GDP) to a low of 57 (between IQ and education).
We use Miguel and Fisman's transformation of the unpaid ticket data, which is bounded below at zero for 18 countries in our sample, and which appears exponentially explosive. Their transformation is the logarithm of (1+total unpaid tickets). Plots of national IQ against logtransformed unpaid tickets per diplomat per year are in Figure 1 .
Results
We begin with a discussion of national IQ. The simple correlation matrix in Table 2 tells much of the story: national IQ strongly correlates with log GDP per capita (0.7) and with the Miguel/Fisman national corruption index (0.6); the correlation with log violations per diplomat is somewhat smaller, -0.5.
Multivariate regressions confirm that the relationship between national average IQ and log violations per diplomat is robust and significant at conventional levels. In the simplest regression-log violations per diplomat on national average IQ-we see that one IQ point is associated with 6.2% fewer tickets per year, quite close to the absolute value of the steady-state relationship between IQ and GDP in Jones and Schneider (2006) , where 1 IQ point is associated with 6% higher GDP per capita.
In the horse-race between IQ and log GDP per capita, the latter falls below conventional statistical significance when predicting unpaid tickets. We then include corruption and IQ, and both are significant at the 1% level; the IQ coefficient drops by less than half compared to the IQ-only regression. Including all three variables at once, the GDP measure is again insignificant, while IQ and corruption are both significant at the 5% level. For comparison, we also include a specification that excludes IQ: Together, they explain 23.8% of the variance in parking tickets, only 1% more than IQ alone. Further, IQ adds substantial predictive power when included in a regression with corruption and GDP controls, raising R 2 by 4.9%, a 20% increase in variance explained.
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These are the core results for national IQ, which we also replicated using log unpaid tickets (not per capita) as the dependent variable, while also including log number of diplomats as a control.
Fisman and Miguel ran most of their specifications with total tickets (not per capita) as the dependent variable, due to the concern that there could be a nation-level factor driving the number of tickets-perhaps the national government places some pressure on the diplomatic mission to control the overall number of tickets, for instance. Such pressure could be correlated with the national level of corruption. In any event, our results differ little from the per-capita specifications; these results are available upon request. Likewise, using a Tobit specification due to the censoring problem at zero tickets had no noticeable impact on our results.
In Table 4 , we control for two additional variables that were significant in the Miguel/Fisman regressions-the log distance between countries and percent of the population of the Islamic faith.
The former is marginally significant, and in both cases, national average IQ remains significant at conventional levels with a large coefficient. Taking the 3.8% coefficient as a lower bound, our results suggest that a two standard deviation decrease in national average IQ-the gap between South Korea (106) and Venezeula (84)-would predict at least a 130% increase in violations of parking norms. In a simple forecasting exercise where we knew only a nation's average IQ, we would predict a 300% increase for the same 22-point IQ decline.
Turning to average years of education, the correlation with violations per diplomat is -0.6 and with corruption is -0.8, and with log GDP per capita is 0.9; so across the board, the correlations are slightly stronger for education than for IQ. Table 5 reports unpaid ticket regression results that control for national average years of education in 1999; the major result is that GDP and corruption are never statistically significant at the 5% level. When controlling simultaneously for IQ and education, the sample size plummets to 57 observations; in this case, IQ drops just below 10% significance, but is still substantially closer to significance than either corruption or GDP.
When percent Muslim is controlled for, education is significant at the 10% but not the 5% level; percent Muslim has stronger predictive power in this case than when one controls for national average IQ. Taking these regression results together, both human capital measures are substantially better for predicting unpaid parking tickets than GDP per capita, and are at least as predictive as Miguel and Fisman's corruption measure.
We also employ a two-stage least squares estimation to see how much of the corruption-ticket relationship could be predicted from knowing only a nation's average IQ or only its education level. Since national corruption, like national IQ or education, is surely measured with error, one can interpret this use of 2SLS as an attempt to reduce the errors-in-variables inherent in the estimated corruption-tickets relationship. But our preferred interpretation is that of forecasting:
We would like to know if corruption is a better predictor of parking tickets when we only look at differences in corruption that can be predicted by either IQ or by education.
We begin by discussing IQ: From the perspective of institutional economic theory and experimental results, it is not clear whether one should think of IQ as merely a driver of the corruption index (an instrument) or as an additional index of social capital (a control). This is an empirical question, and the data offer evidence for both channels: If we instrument corruption with national average IQ in a univariate regression of unpaid tickets per diplomat on corruption, as in Table 6 , the coefficient on corruption almost doubles in size and is highly statistically significant. Thus, IQ-instrumented corruption has a substantially bigger influence on parking tickets than corruption alone.
Since high national IQ is strongly correlated with low corruption, this may come as little surprise-although the result is far from axiomatic. We find a similarly strong result when attempting to predict the corruption-ticket relationship via education alone; but the relationship is weaker when we use log GDP per capita to predict the corruption-ticket relationship. If one knows the relationship between a nation's human capital stock and its level of corruption, one can do quite a good job predicting how its diplomats behave.
2003: The end of tacit cooperation by the intelligent
After 2002, diplomatic immunity for parking tickets ended, as a practical matter. Senators
Schumer and Clinton cosponsored a bill that gave local governments the authority to remove diplomatic license plates from cars with too many tickets. Fisman and Miguel show that diplomats from corrupt countries still tended to get more parking tickets, though the number of parking tickets per diplomat dropped by an average of 90%. Did the national IQ-parking ticket relationship remain negative after 2002?
Overall, no. Rerunning the regressions from Table 3 in the post-immunity era, we find that national average IQ is only statistically significant in the IQ-only specification, and its coefficient dramatically shrinks in size, always shrinks by at least 90%. Thus, once the force of law came to bear on the parking issue, national IQ largely lost its ability to predict conformity to social norms. Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, estimated with White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. *=.05, **=.01, ***=.001 levels of significance. Notes: Constant not reported, t-statistics in parentheses, estimated with White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. *=.05, **=.01, ***=.001 levels of significance. Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, estimated with White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. *=.05, **=.01, ***=.001 levels of significance. 
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